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ABSTRACT: 
Strategizing can be seen as a balancing act between aggregating knowledge and experiences from an 
organization‟s past business cycles and forecasting future possibilities over a longer period of time. 
Yet knowledge about strategizing over business cycles and in rapidly changing market conditions in 
the construction sector is scarce. This paper takes a micro perspective on strategizing and examines 
individual narratives of change processes to identify driving factors. The empirical data is part of an 
ongoing longitudinal case study in a large construction company on strategizing over business cycles 
from 1990 until today. The study comprises in-depth interviews with 14 key actors and a wide range of 
documentation covering the period. The Strategy-as-Practice perspective serves well as a 
retrospective description of strategizing over time; understanding the dynamics that underlie the 
various strategic changes is a matter of understanding what the strategists have done. The paper 
shows that strategy processes mainly are related to a few individuals (mostly the CEO‟s), rather than 
to the activities or rationale behind them. This paper contributes a novel perspective on the strategy 
literature in construction by emphasizing personified strategies as drivers for change. We argue that 
personified strategies are an intra-organizational phenomenon related to power distribution, 
governance, and the tensions between individual agency and the institutionalized context. 
KEYWORDS: diachronic perspective, strategy as practice, personified strategies 
INTRODUCTION  
Corporate strategies are context-dependent and forward-looking conceptions, formulated by a 
given configuration of actors, at a specific time, under particular socio-economic conditions. 
As such strategizing can be seen as a balancing act between aggregating knowledge and 
experiences from an organization‟s past business cycles and forecasting future possibilities 
over a longer period of time. A company‟s strategizing impacts its efficiency, innovativeness, 
competence development, customer focus, environmental sustainability and its work 
processes. Yet knowledge about strategizing over business cycles and in rapidly changing 
market conditions in the construction sector seems to be scarce. Research within the strategy 
field has predominantly focused on a single strategizing cycle (Kaplan et al., 2008), steady-
state conditions (Eisenstatt et al., 2008), dramatic change (Christensen et al., 2003), or the 
importance of employee involvement for implementation (Björnström, 2007). However, 
studying strategy from a diachronic perspective would help us understand how organizations 
use strategy to manage their history – their past, present and future.  
The construction industry is an important player in the Swedish economy and on the labour 
market. However, it has been criticized for low productivity, lack of innovation, negative 
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environmental impact and its large percentage of errors and waste (Lutz & Gabrielsson, 
2002). These problems may in part come from the industry‟s difficulty to leverage knowledge 
and to develop and foster its unique competencies, which in turn may be explained by a lack 
of integration of human-resource and knowledge management at the strategic level 
(Björnström, 2007). There seems to be a lack of awareness among strategists of the 
interdependencies between strategizing and its operational implications over business cycles. 
This is probably related to a strong tendency to focus on functional strategies, resulting in 
efforts being concentrated to a single, short-term objective such as project costs. However, the 
world in which we live is changing rapidly, driven by globalization, internationalization and 
technological advances. To maintain an edge in a changing market, construction companies 
must continuously cultivate and develop their competences and intellectual capital. The need 
for improvements has induced new subjects on the agendas: including for example the pursuit 
of a more efficient building process, increased safety for the workers, ethical code of 
conducts, and sustainable development. Such initiatives force management in construction to 
administer their organization based on more standardized ways of work and this is often 
accompanied by a more centralized organizational structure (e.g., Zábojník, 2002). 
All these issues pose challenges for practitioners as well as researchers. To propose viable 
models and solutions, researchers “need to get close to the sense-making of key 
organizational actors and appreciate the world from their point of view” (Johnson et al., 
2008). Over the last decade Strategy-as-Practice has grown as a distinctive field of strategy- 
management study (e.g. Whittington 2006; Jarzabkowski et al 2007). Strategy-as-Practice 
focuses on strategizing as situated, social practice constructed through interactions of multiple 
actors embedded in institutional contexts. The foundation of Strategy-as-Practice is to 
highlight the micro-actions by which human actors, the strategists, create strategic outcomes; 
strategy is not something that an organization has, it is something that the “strategists” do. 
(Whittington, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski et al., 2008; Gerry Johnson et 
al., 2007; Whittington, 2007).  
This paper takes a micro perspective on strategizing by examining individual narratives of 
change processes, and draws on a Strategy-as-Practice perspective to support the argument 
that strategy processes are often associated with individuals (mostly the CEO´s), rather than 
with the activities or rationale behind them. This paper contributes a novel perspective on the 
strategy literature in construction: it shows how many of the major changes implemented in 
the studied construction company can be viewed as personified strategies. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
The empirical data is part of an ongoing longitudinal case study at Alpha, on strategizing over 
business cycles from 1990 to date. In-depth interviews with 14 upper-level managers were 
carried out during 2010; 11 out of the 14 interviewed managers had been working at Alpha 
for 15 years or more. This part of the study has applied an explorative and interpretative 
approach. 
During the interviews, lasting between 1-2 hours, the respondents were asked to give their 
retrospective accounts of major changes over time, from 1990 to the present, through an 
undirected story-telling. Interviews were conducted until no (or little) new information was 
provided from yet another interview. The managers‟ unified view that emerged account for 
the concern: the managers‟ stories appeared to be overall consistent, albeit from different 
perspectives. Complementary to interviews, a wide range of documentation (company 
 
 
specific as well as media and judicial documentation) covering the period have been analyzed 
in order to identify phenomena that have had a bearing on strategic action over time and that 
documented most of the changes that the managers highlighted. All the interviews were 
transcribed. In a first phase these transcriptions were reviewed, without any pre-determined 
propositions and with no particular codification technique; at this stage we wanted the data to 
“speak to us”. From these readings a pattern gradually emerged. A content analysis was 
carried out, resulting in a list of key words sorted into categories. The salient feature of these 
interviews was their repeated references to persons rather than events or objects. In the 
following we have aggregated the narratives to render an account of Alpha´s trajectory as 
perceived by the interviews 
The first part depicts the overall change over the studied period: how Alpha transformed into 
a more centralized organization. The second part presents two perspectives of the way in 
which managers related changes to persons. 
THE STORY OF ALPHA 
Alpha is one of the largest domestic contractors within building and civil construction as well 
as services related to road construction and civil engineering. This story takes its point of 
departure in the early 1990s. The Swedish recession at this time seriously impacted the 
construction sector, e.g. by forcing them to review their operations to adapt to a more 
competitive market with lower profit margins and shorter construction times.  
From a decentralized towards a centralized organization 
Throughout the 90s Alpha was divided into a number of geographical units, with the company 
slogan: “we build everything, everywhere”. The different units were operated by their 
respective managers and controlled by very few common strategic overall guidelines; as long 
as each manager managed to deliver profit for the unit, few questions were asked from 
Alpha´s board of directors. The company could be described as a conglomerate of 
autonomous companies, as expressed by two of the interviewees (underlining indicates 
speaker emphasis): 
 The different divisions worked very, very independently. Each division manager had his own 
management team and staff, and focused very much on its own business. When the managers 
met, they cared for their own interests, their own divisions [E. E.]. 
 There were autonomous units. We had some kind of board of course, but with limited impact. 
[…] There was a fear to introduce common ways of working [H. H.]. 
During the 90s, top management realized that the potential of this company setting had 
reached its upper boundaries; in order to be competitive the different geographical units 
needed to collaborate. Based on these rationalities, top management formulated a number of 
new goals: to generate predictable profitability; to decrease marginal costs; to implement 
codes of conduct; and, to increase overall efficiency. One concrete example initiated in the 
early 90s was the “X-program” that aimed to shorten production times at a lower cost with 
fewer defects in the final inspections. 
[The X-program] was a vital project. It initiated something important, that is, to work with plans 
which we had never done before. So it was a fundamental driving force to start a process of 
developing a structured way of working. It contributed to an awareness that we needed to 
improve [H. H.]. 
 
 
These goals were to be achieved by capitalizing on the potentials of scale; the building 
process should be more standardized, purchasing done by a centralized unit and the 
indigenous knowledge should be collected and fed back.  
In the early 90s there was not much business planning or strategizing, The X-program was a 
pure efficiency program. […] „A way of working‟ was introduced in the mid 90s, which was a 
milestone for the company. This initiative came from one geographical unit, and then the whole 
company adapted the ideas. All best practice examples in the company were collected and 
documented – that became „Alpha´s Way of Working‟ [E. E.]. 
Moreover, during the 90s, pressure from the market grew regarding ethical conduct and 
environmental concerns. Accordingly, “soft issues” gained the attention of the CEO. As 
exemplified by the following quotes, the opinions diverge whether or not this was a change of 
direction for the company or not: 
It was something special when [CEO] P. introduced soft parameters. Our [Code of conduct] 
was unique for our branch, and all of a sudden we started to speak about how to be open-
minded, honest and to listen. [The CEO] P. was tough and dared to drive these issues, because 
many in the organization were very skeptical. But today, it is a natural part of work. […] The 
[Code of conduct] was a milestone” [E. E.]. 
Our Code of conduct is just a policy document: this is how we view our external environment, 
and how we want the external environment to see us [H. H.]. 
In my world the Code of conduct was a „quick fix‟, and I cannot understand why it has got so 
much attention. […] It could be described as a list of goals for us as an organization [I. L.]. 
In 2003, a major re-reorganization of the company took place which coincided with a change 
of CEO. When CEO W. entered the scene, he did away with a whole hierarchal level, in order 
for the central units to come closer to the building projects. This was experienced by several 
of the interviewees as a breakpoint. At the same time, new corporate strategies were 
formulated, and in 2004 the official launch of a performance measurement tool took place. 
The CEO himself presented the tool at an annual management meeting where all upper and 
lower managers were gathered. 
The fact that a whole hierarchal level was removed, that was a big deal [I. L.]. 
When we formulated our business plan 2003 we got a lot of criticism for having too many 
initiatives at the same time. The [Alpha´s measurement tool] was launched and we started to 
measure and follow up our business. This was a great water spread [H. H.]. 
[CEO] W. introduced transparency, to measure and follow up competitions. Everybody was 
measured, and nobody wanted to be the loser. It was an extreme competition between all units, 
and that was something new [E. E.]. 
Moreover, during the last decade there was also an increased focus on industrial construction 
as well as purchasing issues. Due to increased costs the company was forced to act; 
It was quite obvious at the time; purchasing and industrialization. And it was [CEO] W. who put 
them on the agenda [I. L.]. 
In the latter half of the 00s, and when CEO C. took over from CEO W., the market and the 
customers were brought into the limelight. As expressed by one of the managers, the company 
moved from being introvert, i.e. focusing on internal efficiency, to a more extrovert company, 
i.e. focusing on external factors; 
 
 
[CEO] W. never talked about customers and market issues, he only talked about internal 
efficiency. But now we have started to talk about „extrovert‟ issues. Well, I don‟t think it is such 
a big change in what we actually do, but at least we talk about it” [I. L.]. 
But despite these changes the business managers at Alpha did not experience a satisfactory 
implementation of the formulated plans, and 2009 Alpha underwent another major 
organizational makeover; support functions including HR, economy, and business support 
were moved from the geographic units to form one overall support unit. 
The interviewed managers all seem to agree that the major changes that Alpha has undergone 
during the last two decades have been in the best interest of the company, at least in theory. In 
order to support these changes Alpha needed not only a different organizational structure, but 
new organizational roles. The managers‟ opinions regarding the changes that were initiated 
during the 90s often concerned the challenge of changing the attitudes of the managers, who 
had run the geographical units with a free hand during the 90s, to accept the new constraints 
and delimited leadership role in a centralized Alpha. One manager described the situation in 
the beginning of the 00s when Alpha already had taken a number of steps towards centralizing 
the organization: 
…during [CEO] E‟s time the management team was like a committee with different interests. 
There existed some sort of underlying understanding that the less they decided collectively, the 
more influence they would have over their own operations [X. X.]. 
 
Individual agency: turning ‘handymen’ into ‘specialists’  
Traditionally, in most cases managers at different organizational levels at Alpha have been 
recruited internally and the vast majority of the interviewed managers have therefore 
experienced all the mentioned changes. The interviewees kept repeating that there was a 
challenge to make the managers align with the centralized organization and use the 
standardized ways of working when operating in their units of responsibility. Opinions 
expressed in relation to this were that the responsibility distribution has now become 
somewhat unclear in the centralized organization: 
The [2009] re-organization has led to a somewhat vague responsibility distribution, meaning 
that „if I don‟t act, at least I haven‟t done anything wrong‟. This leads to a kind of „no action‟ 
[…] We are moving from a simple world to a more complex one, and consequently more 
intelligent control system is needed. However, I do not think that Alpha has chosen the easiest 
solution [I. L.]. 
Such views might be rather natural consequences in an organization going from less control to 
more control. Vibes of „the happy times back then‟ were worded: 
Yes, we play to win, but [nowadays] we play a pretty boring game [laughter] [M. Y.]. 
Or: 
We lost a few to Beta
2
 a couple of years ago, and I guess it was those that felt it wasn‟t as free at 
Alpha anymore, and that was only right. We shouldn‟t keep those who want to be „handymen‟ if 
we want to attain our new strategy [K. K., regarding the overall change from the 90s up to 
now].  
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The managers also described their constant effort to increase the „team spirit‟ at Alpha: during 
the 90s individuals had been very much in focus: 
 These unit managers [of the 90s] were really Alpha‟s strongmen [X. C.]. 
However, Alpha‟s „strongmen‟ seem to be re-emerging, albeit in different roles, as was 
alluded to in most interviews. Below, the importance of the individual agency symbolized by 
the metaphor „strongmen‟ will be exemplified from two different perspectives: epochs and 
strategy processes as one manager‟s decision. 
Relating change to persons: two different perspectives. 
 
Epochs 
A common feature in all the interviews was the strong focus on Alpha´s leaders, or 
„strongmen‟ and the epochs that were ascribed to them. The latter were alluded to as leader-
epochs. As described above, Alpha has undergone a number of structural and strategic 
changes during the last two decades which were often described in similar terms, 
That would have to be when Mr. E was CEO if I remember correctly [Y. F. regarding a certain 
strategy that Alpha had during a certain time]. 
That disappeared when…what was his name…Mr. P. became CEO [W. W. regarding the fact 
that the basis for the product divisions changed at some point]. 
These examples show how several of the interviewees related a certain strategic plan or an 
organizational structure to a particular CEO. The following example elucidates the same 
pattern, even when asking them closed questions.  
Interviewer: “Was the organization structured on the basis of products or geography then?” 
Products. It was on the basis of products back in 97. Alpha was basically divided into two parts 
back then; one part was Alpha Building and the other was Alpha Civil and then different 
divisions within these. That particular structure was between 97 and 98 and it was with Mr. G. 
as the manager… Mr. G. took the Civil-part in Sweden and Mr. P. took the Building-
part….or…did he really take the building-part? Maybe it was Mr. C. that took the Building-part 
as well?  I think it was Mr. C. And then in 98, Mr. P. became the CEO for the whole Alpha 
Sweden [X. C.]. 
Here is another example; 
Interviewer: “How often do you have your regional manager meetings?” 
 It has been more frequent. [CEO] W. introduced, he was the one that started to focus on the 
regions and it was then…Well, he started to have these regional manager meetings [Y. F.]. 
The managers expressed themselves in this manner during the interviews, and it was not only 
in the descriptions of certain time epochs or specific events that the managers seemed to relate 
to the company leaders; even their personal experiences seemed to be related to Alpha´s 
leaders. The next example is from a conversation regarding one of the Alpha´s company 
archive. A manager was asked what kind of documents this archive contains, and the manager 
in question delivered a rather informed answer. 
I have been there actually. I was there with the management team, when Mr. W. was CEO and 
we stayed there a whole afternoon and had the opportunity to go through a lot of old magazines 
and articles. It was very interesting [E. E.]. 
 
 
Strategy processes as a leader’s decision 
One part of this study focused on Alpha‟s procedures for developing a new strategy and the 
main driving forces behind strategy changes. It was rather surprising that none of the 
interviewees talked of strategy work as a process; rather, strategy was seen as “belonging” to 
the CEO. He (all of the CEOs have been men) is seen as “owning” the strategic decision, i.e. 
as personified action.  
The first example below is from a section when one of the managers described a major 
strategy reform and organizational makeover that Alpha carried out in the beginning of the 
00s. 
When Mr. W. was appointed CEO he wanted to remove this whole hierarchal level. He thought 
there was just too much management staff [E. E]. 
Some more examples where the managers refer to strategic decisions as owned by a leader: 
It was the idea of [CEO] E. who believed that we should come closer to our customers by having 
geographical divisions [I. L.]. 
[CEO] E. split up the product divisions and made geographical divisions instead [E. E.]. 
Our [Code of conduct] was [CEO] P.‟s idea. He was an „ethical man‟. He took that initiative; 
otherwise it would never have happened [H. H.]. 
One of the managers captured the role of the leaders with the following clauses; “…and then 
we changed CEO, and he wanted it in another way”. Several of the managers referred to 
individual agency in combination with „a sense of urgency‟ as the main driving forces behind 
strategic changes at Alpha.  
 The individuals are strong forces [for changes], but it is also a matter of trends [H. H.]. 
It is more about the individuals who drive the changes. The format is not that important. […] I 
think it is a combination of these two; a sense of urgency and the right man at the right place [I. 
L.]. 
However, this notion of leaders as central figures in relation to company epochs, strategy 
work, and personal experiences is contradicted by one of the interviewed managers. This 
manager did not mention any of Alpha‟s leaders throughout his long narrative, but instead 
consistently describes epochs, strategy work, and overall changes as devoid of personal 
agency. He had however worked for Alpha a considerably shorter time (approx. ten years) 
than the most of the other managers interviewed and had therefore not experienced the 90s 
when the „handymen/strongmen‟ operated the different geographical units. When we asked 
him about the roles played by the leaders, he confirmed their centrality. The next example is 
extracted from a section in which he then is talking about W.; 
This work with ´developing a more efficient building process´ and ´increasing the overall 
performance at Alpha´ was [Mr. W.‟s] baby. That was when I worked with the [Alpha´s 
measurement tool]…because he was the father of that project [R. S.]. 
As mentioned above, the vast majority of the interviewees had worked for Alpha for more 
than 15 years and they had been recruited internally; a tradition that is common for the 
construction industry. Two of the managers were exceptions and had other backgrounds; they 
were not fostered in Alpha´s building projects, but were recruited straight into an upper-level 
manager position. The few contradictions to relating change to persons (mostly the CEOs) 
 
 
came from these three managers; the one that didn‟t work for Alpha during the 90´s, and the 
two that were recruited externally. All three of them did however support this indication, 
when we asked them specific questions about it. One of them said:  
 So, I was very into the idea of „the insignificance of single individuals‟, but I really had to 
revise this perception when I started to work for Alpha. … These individuals actually mean a lot 
for Alpha, for good and for bad. I have realized that a CEO actually has a lot more influence 
over a company than what I thought when I first started to work here [A. B.]. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
During the period covered by this article, there has been both direct and indirect pressure on 
construction companies to develop a more efficient building process as well as obliging to 
growing ethical and environmental concerns. This has called for, and resulted in, a gradual 
transformation into a more standardized and centralized organization. This transformation is 
not unique for Alpha; but common for the whole construction industry, which has been 
looking to the manufacturing industry for models to emulate. The first part of Alpha‟s story 
shows that even though the managers appreciated the needs for a more centralized 
organization, there seemed to be some criticism regarding the consequences. This criticism 
manifested itself mainly as a discontent of having to give up decision-making mandates, as a 
sacrifice to organizational standards. The transformation that Alpha underwent can be 
described as unification in the name of economies of scale: merging activities into centralized 
functions and standardizing ways of work. As a consequence of these changes, Alpha is now, 
to a larger extent, run by a pre-determined plan with less room for subjective decision-making 
within the operational routines. It could be argued that top-management still decides what 
kinds of standardization that should be applied, but incremental standardization accumulates 
into indigenous „givens‟ and will therefore delimit managers´ choices (e.g. Melander et al. 
2008).  
We identified an interesting phenomenon when examining the managers´ narratives. Epochs, 
personal experiences, strategy processes, and decisions were all dimensions in which a salient 
individual focus emerged. All these dimensions were personified to a large extent, the 
interviewees seldom referred to the rationale behind the time epochs, the personal 
experiences, the strategy processes, and the decisions, but rather to the specific CEO that they 
associated the events with; that person embodied the events to the point of representing the 
event itself. 
The Strategy-as-Practice perspective advocates an emphasis on what people do, but it would 
probably have appeared as reasonable for many researchers and practitioners, to understand 
Alpha‟s transformation throughout the years as the strategies that Alpha (as a company) had 
and the strategies that Alpha (as a company) changed – in relation to e.g. their market, their 
competitors, their internal resources. Such units of analysis, however, risk ignoring the inter-
subjectivity dimensions of what the strategists do; and overestimate the degree of causality 
between e.g. market, competitors, internal resources and specific company actions. The story 
told in this article supports this point as well as the most fundamental standpoint of the 
Strategy-as-Practice perspective – “strategy isn‟t something an organization has, it is 
something that the strategists do”, and from the perspective of a number of upper-level 
managers in our study, it is something that some few individuals did (mainly the CEOs). 
It is clear that Alpha throughout time has reacted to circumstances, e.g. by changing their 
strategies – but via the subjectivities of these persons (the strategists). Some of the strategic 
 
 
actions presented in the case are however examples of when the strategists‟ subjectivities 
probably align closely with the institutionalized context, e.g., “the stock owners and the 
customers don‟t tolerate morally questionable behavior; we must do something about it”. But 
even these more “obvious” strategic changes were personified in the narratives; processes and 
decisions are formalized, but they are also personified. The upper-mangers included in this 
study related changes throughout time to the different CEO´s; and it seems like every CEO is 
associated with major changes. Noel (1989) concludes that it was the CEO´s unique 
personalities that decided the strategic direction for a number of companies that were studied 
in a field research setting, and the stories told in this article indicate something similar – 
strategic change is perceived as something that the CEO´s have done, rather than as a process 
or as a rationale. Using another quote: 
“ … it was common for a CEO to do something and you shouldn‟t do the same something as the CEO before 
you; that was more important than doing something good and right” [D.E. (upper-level manager), regarding the 
different CEO´s that Alpha have had throughout the years]. 
The largest change described by the managers is the transformation from a decentralized 
organization to a more centralized organization, via a period in the 1990´s where Alpha´s 
different geographical units worked independently from one another, relying on their 
“strongmen” to make decisions.3 It is possible that the circumstances during 1990´s created a 
company culture in which the subjectivity of a few leaders became a strong driver for 
strategic change; today, a number of upper- level managers relate strategic change to the 
“strongmen”, mostly the CEO´s. 
It is however important to point out that little is known about the cause behind the identified 
phenomenon of personified strategies; the stories told are reconstructions of events and 
relating events to persons might be a mnemonic strategy rather than a mechanism of strategic 
change in real-time. It could also just be a version that seemed appropriate to share with 
researchers. We believe however that the degree of conformity among all the individual 
perspectives provides reason enough to pay attention to personified strategies and the 
implications. 
Burgelman et al. (2005) note that internal corporate development cycles usually span over a 
longer period of time than a CEO usually stays at the same company; important long-term 
development strategies might therefore be disrupted if every CEO wants to (or feel they have 
to) change the strategy. Regardless of the effects from development cycles; personified 
strategies could likely diminish the holistic effects of strategizing; as the sum of a company‟s 
competencies all together – which is the rationale behind the more standardized organization 
that Alpha has transformed into in order to meet the challenges on the changing markets.  
The notion of "strategist" remains unproblematized in the Strategy-as-Practice field. This 
article is a first attempt to bridge this gap. Concentrating on upper-level managers, we have 
seen that there seems to be a tendency to associate strategic change with one specific strategist 
(the CEO). Such a perception could result in norms that put all responsibilities and risks onto 
one person. Furthermore, such pressure may be one reason why new CEOs may feel obliged 
to institute change (of any kind). However, associating strategies and changes with one person 
may also exaggerate the role of one strategists, understating the roles of others who may be 
equally involved in strategising; if upper-level managers associate change mainly with one 
top-level strategist, what responsibilities do they ascribe to themselves? If strategic change is 
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actually driven by one strategist‟s subjectivity; then we could ask ourselves whether we can 
refer to strategy as a concept at all. 
On the basis of the above, we conclude by suggesting that personified strategies could be 
important drivers for strategic change in construction, albeit not necessarily to drive 
strategising as such. Rather to drive the legitimacy of a new CEO. Research needs to be 
carried out in order to further explore the complexities of personified strategies. 
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